This paper is concerned with some methodological and philosophical problems related both to the longterm objective of building human-like robots (like those 'in the movies') and short-and medium-term objectives of building robots with capabilities of more or less intelligent animals. In particular, we claim that organisms are information-processing machines, and thus information-processing concepts will be essential for designing biologically-inspired robots. However identifying relevant concepts is non trivial since what an information processor is doing cannot in general be determined simply by observing it. Having a general framework for describing and comparing agent architectures may help.
Introduction
A difficulty in studying and modelling biological systems is that researchers may be 'ontologically blind' to certain important features of those systems. This is a general problem at the frontiers of science: someone may perceive and think about how fast objects move, but never notice that besides a velocity objects can have an instantaneous acceleration. Likewise, a researcher who thinks the function of visual systems is merely to provide information about lowerorder physical phenomena such as geometrical shapes, motion, distances, and colours (Marr, 1982) may never notice situations where vision provides information about abstract relationships between relationships (Evans, 1968) , information about affordances, e.g. graspability, obstruction, danger, opportunity (Gibson, 1986) , or information about causal relationships, e.g. a rope restraining a stick (Kohler, 1927) .
Similarly, a researcher who thinks the only goals organisms can have are to achieve or prevent certain low-level physical occurrences, such as maintaining a particular hormonal concentration, may never notice other sorts of goals, such as trying to work out what caused a noise, or improving a way of thinking about certain problems. Someone who thinks that all learning is learning of associations may fail to notice cases where learning includes extension of an ontology, or development of a new representational formalism. (Compare Chomsky's attack on Skinner (Chomksy, 1959) .) Whether or not these latter forms of learning can be or are realised in a purely associative learning mechanisms is beside the point; a theorist who 'sees' only the associative mechanisms will be ontologically blind to other forms of learning.
This paper investigates problems of identifying what organisms do and how they do it, and thereby determining objectives for designers of biologically-inspired robots. Ontological blindness need not be permanent: a recurring feature of the history of science is a process of extending the ontologies employed, thereby changing what becomes not only thinkable but also observable, somewhat like learning to read a foreign language in an alien culture.
Non-physical aspects of organisms
It is relatively easy to observe the gross physical behaviour of organisms, their physical environment, and to some extent, their internal physical, chemical, physiological mechanisms. But insofar as biological organisms are to a large extent control systems (Wiener, 1961) , or more generally information processing systems, finding out what they do as controllers or as information processors is a very different task from observing physical behaviour, whether internal or external.
That is because the most important components of an information processor may be components of virtual machines rather than physical machines. Like physical machines, virtual machines do what they do by virtue of the causal interaction of their parts, but such parts are non-physical (by 'non-physical', we don't mean 'not physically realised' or 'made ultimately of non-physical stuff' but merely 'not easily characterised with the vocabulary and methods of the physical sciences'). Compare the notion of a 'propaganda machine'. Components of virtual machines include grammars, parsers, decision makers, motive generators, concepts, emotional states, inference engines, knowledge stores, rule sets, and plans, rather than molecules, transistors or neurones.
An example of a component of a virtual machine in biology is the niche of a species. A niche is not a geographical location or a physical environment; for an ant, a badger, and a cat may be in the same physical location yet have completely different niches.
The niche is not something that can be observed or measured using instruments employed in the physical sciences. Yet the niche is causally very important, both in the way that the organism works (e.g. as an information processor) and in the way that a species evolves (Sloman, 2000a) . A niche is part of what determines features of new generations, and in some cases may be involved in reproducing itself, for instance if members of a species all alter the environment in such a way as to enhance their biological fitness. An example would be termites building and maintaining their cathedrals, which help to produce new generations which will do the same.
So the niche, the set of abstract properties common to results of such genetically induced actions, could be labelled as part of an 'extended genotype', by analogy with Dawkins' 'extended phenotype' (Dawkins, 1982) .
Additional conceptual problems bedevil the task of deciding what features, especially non-physical ones, of a biological system are to be replicated in robots. For instance, many of our current concepts are inadequate for specifying design features. E.g. the question whether a certain animal, or robot, has emotions or is conscious or feels pain suffers from the multiple confusions in our current notion(s) of mental states and processes (Sloman, 2002a , Sloman, 2001a . So, in part, our task is to explain how to make those obscure concepts clearer, for instance by interpreting them as 'architecturebased' concepts (op.cit).
3 How to avoid the problem? (Or, Here's one I prepared earlier)
It is tempting to avoid thinking about how to design biologically-inspired robots and instead try to evolve them, since animals provide an existence proof of the power of evolution. But this may not lead beyond the most elementary of robots in the foreseeable future, because of both the computational power required for replicating evolution of complex animals and also the problem of designing suitable evaluation functions (Zaera et al., 1996) . Specifically, the apparent power of genetic algorithms to solve all design problems seems to be as illusory as the apparent power of David Blaine, a popular street magician, to read minds, predict the future, etc. That is, both often rely on an hidden 'here's one I prepared earlier' approach. E.g., Blaine writes 'Sophie' on his arm under his sleeve, then goes around the city all day with a camera crew, telling women that he can predict what their name is, revealing his arm, until eventually he does this to a woman named Sophie. Her amazed reaction is recorded and broadcast, so viewers are amazed as well. Similarly, some GA papers report only the successes, and not the failures, giving a similarly skewed representation of the powers of GAs. In natural evolution, implicit evaluation functions develop partly through co-evolutionary processes which alter niches. Replicating this may require simulating the evolution of many species, leading to astronomical computational requirements. Moreover, insofar as the process is partly random there is no way of knowing whether simulated evolution will produce what we are trying to replicate. Even on earth there was never any guarantee that penguins, piranhas or people would ever evolve. So the time required to evolve a robot like those organisms may include multiple failed attempts. Perhaps explicit design, inspired by nature, will be quicker.
How to attack the problem
This paper is an attempt to analyse the problems for those who think that we shall have to do some explicit design work in order to build robots coming anywhere near the capabilities of mammals, for example. Of course that is consistent with leaving some of the details of the design to be generated by learning or adaptive processes or evolutionary computations.
In any case, similar design problems also arise for those who try to use artificial evolution, if they wish to understand the products of their experiments, since understanding how a complex system works is not unlike knowing how to design one like it.
Organisms are information processing machines
Machines need not be artificial: organisms are machines, since they are complex functioning wholes which do something. Organisms can be viewed simultaneously as several machines of different sorts. Clearly they are machines that can reorganise matter in their environment and within themselves, e.g. when growing. Like windmills and dynamos, animals are also machines that acquire, store, transform and use energy. However, unlike many of the systems studied by physicists or built by engineers in the past, organisms are also information processing machines (some people would say 'cybernetic systems').
Many objects whose behaviour is directed by something in the environment acquire the energy from the same thing: a string pulling an object, a wall causing a change of direction, wind blowing something, etc. Most organisms, however, use internal (chemical) energy along with external information. Having sensed environmental features then, depending on their current state, they select useful actions, and use internal energy to achieve them, for example producing motion in the direction of a maximal chemical or temperature gradient, or motion towards a light, or a potential mate or food. (Compare the discussion of 'switching organs' in (von Neumann, 1951) , for which 'the energy of the response cannot have been supplied by the original stimulus. It must originate in a different and independent source of power.' (p 426))
Information acquired through sensors and the action selection processes will be different for organisms with different niches, even in the same location. The use of the information will also vary with the internal state, e.g. selecting motion towards food or motion towards water. Where the influence of the environment is purely through physical forces, the resulting behaviour will be determined by the resultant of those forces, combining all their effects. However, an information processing system can consider a situation, and then decide not to act on some external information when there are conflicting needs.
Investigating these phenomena in order to replicate them in robots requires deep theories regarding various types of internal processing. Obviously biological evolution produces many changes in physical design. Not so obviously there are changes in information processing capabilities, which may sometimes be far more dramatic than the physical changes. For example, apes and humans are physically very similar (i.e. there are simple structural mappings between most of their physical parts) whereas their information processing capabilities are very different as shown by their behaviour and its products (their extended phenotype). On a small scale their movements may be similar: walking, climbing, jumping, eating, etc. But on a large scale there are huge differences insofar as only humans make diggers, cranes, skyscrapers, aeroplanes, farm many kinds of food, do mathematics and write poetry. Creatures with structurally similar bodies can have structurally very dissimilar minds.
1 Furthermore, given that brains are highly complex and therefore extremely sensitive to boundary conditions, even organisms with identical brain structure can have very different minds. A level of characterisation above the physical, anatomical level will do better at modelling this substantial difference by representing it with a substantial difference in the characterisation itself.
Hidden differences in information processing
Given its abstract, non-physical nature, information processing may be difficult to detect in natural systems using observational techniques usual in the physical sciences.
Even when similar behaviours are observed in different organisms it does not follow that the behaviours are the outcome of similar internal processes (Hauser, 2001) .
Furthermore, as argued in (Sloman, 2001b) , two organisms in the same environment may perceive radically different things. For example, a deer and a lion apparently gazing at the same scene will not necessarily see the same things, since their niches and affordances differ substantially. In particular, altricial species (which are born under-developed and almost helpless, e.g. lions) may develop major aspects of their visual capabilities during early development whereas adults of precocial species (born with a more advanced collection of capabilities, e.g. deer, sheep) have simpler capabilities mostly produced by their genes -e.g. enabling new born grazing animals to stand, walk find and suck nipples or even run with the herd within hours of being born. Hunters, nest-builders and berry-pickers may need to see more complex (or environmentally-dependent) affordances than grazers, and genetic encoding may not suffice for them.
We still have much to learn about information processing systems. The simplest kinds can be described in terms of homeostatic feedback loops or hierarchical control loops, possibly characterised by sets of partial differential equations. But we also know that there are many information processing machines (including parsers, planners, problem-solvers, operating systems, compilers, email networks, theorem provers, market trading systems, chess computers) whose most useful description does not take that form.
There is no reason to assume that all biological information processors will turn out to be simply large collections of analog feedback loops, even adaptive ones: work in AI in the last half century demonstrated how much more powerful alternative forms of information processing and control can be, for some tasks. But we do not yet have a good overview of the alternatives, or their strengths and weaknesses, and that makes theory construction very difficult.
How to describe information processors
It is only recently that scientists and engineers have begun to understand requirements for investigating and modelling information processing systems. Using a very restricted conceptual framework can constrain the questions asked and the theories proposed in the study of humans and other animals. This can also lead to a narrow view of robot functionality (Braitenberg, 1984) .
It is also common to use a restricted notion of computation, defined in terms of something like a Turing machine (Sloman, 2002b ). An alternative is to treat 'computation' and 'information processing' as very broad terms applicable to a wide range of types of control systems. For instance, we do not exclude information processing systems that contain continuously varying states, whereas Turing machines and their equivalents must be discrete. (See also talk 4 in http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/˜axs/misc/talks/.) As a complement to more restrictive approaches we are trying to develop a schematic framework (called 'CogAff'), described in previous papers (Sloman, 2000a , Sloman, 2000b , Sloman, 2001a , Sloman, 2002a , for comparing and contrasting a wide range of information-processing architectures (typically virtual machine architectures, which will not necessarily map in any simple way to the underlying physical architecture). The framework permits combinations of concurrently active reactive 2 , deliberative and meta-management (reflective) mechanisms. Within this framework we can analyse the trade-offs that might have led to evolution of hybrid systems with various subsets of these components.
This three-way distinction does not apply solely to central processing, but allows us to distinguish perceptual and action sub-systems according to whether or not they have components that operate concurrently at different levels of abstraction related to the three architectural layers. The point made at the beginning, that scientists can view a subject matter on different levels of abstraction, is a general one: We perceive on the meta-mental level when we see the state of mind of another person (seeing someone as happy, angry, in pain or attentive). No doubt there might be other cases of organisms perceiving on the deliberative or meta-management levels, as opposed to being capable only of doing feature detection or pattern recognition of the lowest order ('multi-window' vs 'peephole' perception) (Sloman, 2001b) . This possibility should be reflected in any attempt to characterise the space of possible architectures for biological intelligence. Some architectures include one or more 'alarm mechanisms' (Figure 2) , i.e. reactive sub-systems with inputs from many parts of the rest of the system and outputs to many parts, capable of triggering global reorganisation of activities, a feature of many emotional processes.
Links to empirical research
Using this framework we can study organisms by trying to identify architectures with components and information linkages able both to explain what we already know about their capabilities and also to suggest research questions that will extend what we know about the organisms, generating new (Sloman, 2001a) how a full three level architecture can explain at least three different classes of emotions found in humans. Organisms with only a subset of the architectural layers will not be capable of having all those emotions. Obviously if insects lack a deliberative layer they will not be able to have emotions (such as regret!) that require 'what if' representational capabilities, as humans can. Barkley (1997) unwittingly discusses meta-management architectural features relevant to disorders of attention.
Another application of these ideas concerns theories of perceptual processing, including vision. Although the layers and columns of the CogAff schema need not correspond to anatomically distinct components of an organism, it is consistent with such differentiation. Furthermore, the fact that the layers in a particular organism evolved at different times might make such differentiation likely. It follows that if, as we conjecture, sensory inputs in humans and some other animals are processed concurrently at different levels of abstraction, with information from the different levels transmitted concurrently to different parts of the architecture, which use the information for different tasks, then we can easily explain empirical results that have led some scientists to postulate different perceptual pathways (Goodale and Milner, 1992 ), though we would predict more diverse pathways than empirical evidence suggests so far. Likewise if the ability to be aware of and to report visual processing depends on the meta-management layer getting information about intermediate structures in the visual system, then we easily explain the possibility of blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1997) in a system where some connections to meta-management are damaged while some visual processes remain intact for instance in reactive mechanisms.
By analysing possible changes within the different levels and different links between the levels, we can identify different possible kinds of adaptation, learning and development, inspiring both new empirical research and new kinds of designs for self-modifying architectures.
Exploring design space
As we thereby gain a deeper understanding of the space of possible architectures (design space) we can raise an ever-growing collection of questions for empirical research, and also more sensibly select designs for specific sorts of biologically-inspired robots. This task is enriched by relating it to the study of different types of niches, and the relationships between designs and niches of different sorts, helping us to understand how biological evolution works, and possibly helping us design better artificial evolution mechanisms (Zaera et al., 1996) .
One of the reasons for lack of success of symbolic AI systems in the 1970s and 1980s was their lack of a 'meta-management' (reflective) layer (Minsky, 1987 , Beaudoin, 1994 to monitor and evaluate problem-solving processes as they occur, and possibly redirect them: a problem which we claim was solved long ago by evolution at least in the design of human brains. This analysis contradicts the widely-believed claim in (Damasio, 1994 , Picard, 1997 ) that such processes necessarily involve emotions.
Experiments illustrating the evolutionary impact of simple changes within the space defined by our framework are reported in (Scheutz and Sloman, 2001 ). There is much more exploration to be done of this sort and we have developed tools to help with the task (Sloman and Logan, 1999) .
The generic CogAff framework allows many variations in conforming architectures, including both simpler, insectlike architectures, and more complex additional mechanisms required for more sophisticated deliberative and metamanagement processes. In (Sloman, 2001a) . we sketch such an elaborated instance the H-Cogaff architecture. There is much to be said about the additional components required, but space constraints rule that out here.
Using the framework to guide research
For decades AI has suffered from swings of fashion in which people have felt they have to propose and defend a particular type of architecture as 'right' and others as 'wrong'. This should be replaced by research that systematically compares design or modelling options, including hybrid combinations, in order to understand the trade-offs. The CogAff schema can be used to provide a framework that promotes research: (a) asking questions about an organism: which of the subcomponents and which of the links between components does it have, and what difference would it make if the architecture were different in various ways? (b) asking similar questions about the ontologies and forms of representations used by different organisms, e.g. what are the affordances they can detect, and how can they use them? (c) considering alternative designs for artificial systems, and investigating the pros and cons of including or omitting some of the sub-mechanisms or links between sub-mechanisms; (d) illuminating evolutionary investigations by enabling us to identify and analyse possible evolutionary trajectories in design space and in niche space (Sloman, 2000a, Scheutz and Sloman, 2001) .
It is common in AI to argue that a particular sort of architecture is a good one and then to try to build instances in order to demonstrate its merits. However, this may be of limited value if it is not clear what the space of possible architectures is and what the trade-offs are between the different designs within that space. So even if a particular architecture supports some capability or produces some desired robot behaviour we may be left in the dark as to whether a different architecture might have explained more or produced a more useful or interesting robot.
Likewise performing evolutionary computation experiments to develop a good design to solve some problem will not increase our understanding of why one design works and another does not, unless we have a good ontology for describing designs and their relationships to various niches.
An explicitly comparative framework encourages a more analytical approach, even if it is not strictly necessary for finding good solutions to engineering problems. (Cf. discovering useful drugs for treating diseases, without understanding how the diseases or the drugs work.) The framework also helps us understand how different architectures may produce the same behaviours, forcing us to develop more sophisticated criteria for evaluating scientific models of organisms than visible behavioural equivalence.
Uncovering problems by designing solutions
Of course we are not proposing sitting in our armchairs and designing then implementing systems: any engineer knows that you only understand the problem to be solved after you have designed and tested (including interacting with) a variety of prototype solutions. The same applies to understanding what needs to be explained in the case of natural information processing systems. Often it is only when you discover surprising things a model does and does not do that you understand what its task specification should have been.
For example, a prototype may work as expected on a variety of planned test cases, then produce bizarre behaviour when a new test is attempted. Sometimes understanding this requires the researcher's ontology to be extended -for instance noticing that environments can differ in ways that were not previously noticed but are significant for the organism being modelled. An example could be discovering that the same perceptual information is interpreted differently in different contexts by the original organism but not by the prototype robot, pointing to the need for the robot to recognize and use information about such contexts.
Another case is finding systems that work well when they can solve a problem but work very badly otherwise, for instance continuing to search blindly because they have not noticed that a strategy cannot succeed -like many AI systems and also the patient Eliot in (Damasio, 1994) . That observation might draw attention to a previously unnoticed requirement for managing internal processing, as happened in research on symbolic AI problem-solving systems. Learning from partly unsuccessful prototypes has fuelled growth in concepts used by AI researchers over the last 50 years, including a switch from emphasis on representations and algorithms to emphasis on architectures -e.g. (Albus, 1981 , Brooks, 1986 , Minsky, 1987 , Laird et al., 1987 , Beaudoin, 1994 , Nilsson, 1998 .
Asking questions about an information processing system
Understanding an information processing system requires us not only to find out how it behaves in various environments and how it is internally made up from physical components, but also to ask some questions about abstract features of its functionality. For example, if the architecture includes a deliberative layer we can ask what sort of representational formalisms and mechanisms enable it to represent unperceived possibilities.
A similar question can be asked about reactive systems or sub-systems, even though not everyone is happy to use the term 'representation' in that context. They may prefer to ask: What kinds of system states and processes can store information used by the system? How can those states vary (e.g. do they vary like vectors in a fixed dimensional vector space, or can they vary in structure and complexity like sentences or tree structures?). How is the information therein extended, compared, retrieved, and used, and for what functions? 3 As said before, investigating types of information and manipulative mechanisms that exist within virtual machines can be extremely difficult, since in general they cannot be observed using conventional scientific methods, either in externally observable behaviour nor in the physical or physiological processes in brains.
How do animals with deliberative capabilities represent collections of possibilities inherent in a situation? Modal logics can be used to represent possibilities and impossibilities, but it is not obvious that animal minds use such formalisms (Sloman, 1996a) . Likewise if a perceptual system detects affordances, we can ask whether this is implemented purely at the reactive level by triggering appropriate behavioural responses, or whether affordances are somehow described in a deliberative sub-system that can consider whether to make use of them and if so which ones, and how. A system with both layers might use both mechanisms in parallel.
If there is a meta-management layer that includes self-monitoring and self-evaluation capabilities we can ask what sorts of categorisations of internal states are used, whether the evaluations are innate or learned, and, if learned, how much influence the surrounding culture has (e.g. whether individuals can feel guilt or shame, as opposed to merely regretting what they have done.)
Extending our design ontology
There may be some benefit to the community studying biologically-inspired robots if we generalise some of the currently used ontology, as has often happened in the history of science when new commonalities are discovered. E.g. the label 'energy' was extended to entirely new phenomena such as chemical energy and mass energy, allowing a more general interpretation of the principle of conservation of energy, and the idea of 'feedback' was extended from mechanical controllers to electrical, chemical, biological and socio-economic processes.
Likewise instead of describing some systems as using representations and others as having changeable states that can store useful information, we can describe both as using representations, and then discuss the similarities and differences between the different types of representation and representation-manipulating mechanisms. We can then usefully extend the interpretation of questions like these about animals and machines:
What kinds of syntax are used (what information structures and syntactic transformations)?
What kinds of semantics are used (which ontologies, hypotheses, questions, explanations, beliefs, intentions, plans)?
What pragmatic functions is the information used for (goals, desires, puzzles, strategies, preferences, values, triggering new states, etc.)? Of course, not all these questions are relevant to all organisms.
Since these phenomena are all very abstract, exploring them is not like perceiving physical behaviour, but requires us to develop appropriate meta-ontologies and new modes of investigation. But that is not unusual in science: similar developments were required before biologists could study abstractions like 'function', 'adaptation', 'metabolism', 'niche', 'gene' and 'extended phenotype'.
Enriching our conceptual frameworks
Our grasp of categories required for information processing in natural systems is still very limited, compared with the ontologies we have developed for designing and talking about systems analysed in computer science and software engineering. In studying most animals we are probably in the situation of someone trying to understand what a computer is doing who has never studied operating systems, compilers, programming techniques, networking, word processors, databases, expert systems, etc.
A physicist or electronic engineer who knows nothing about these things may be able to investigate many of the physical and electronic properties of the computer, without ever dreaming that he is leaving anything out. The ontology used by an organism will not be made visible by studying physical processes in its brain. Opening up the brain of an expert computer scientist will not teach you about compilers and schedulers. So in addition to the general possibility of ontological blindness: we may be ontologically blind to some aspect of the ontology used by an organismsecond order ontological blindness.
Neither are the information processing capabilities visible in the externally observable behaviour or input-output mappings displayed by machines or animals -except to those who have developed appropriate theories to guide their observations and interpretations. We therefore need ways of thinking about and investigating aspects of biological systems (organisms, species, ecosystems) that are not necessarily observable to us today, but may be crucial for understanding how they work.
Understanding such (currently) 'invisible' aspects of processes in organisms may be a requirement for realistic simulations or models, especially when we are starting from inherently different physical implementations, such as computers and digital circuits instead of brains and neurones, or electro-mechanical devices instead of muscles and bones. People who do not address the questions regarding the important abstractions may therefore build simulations which very superficially model biological systems without realising that there are important phenomena to which they are ontologically blind and which they have not modelled.
In some cases, attempting to get desired results by trying to replicate physical structures using artificial components may fail, like early attempts to replicate bird flight; whereas replication at a higher level of abstraction may be more successful -as happened in the history of achieving artificial flight (Armer, 1962, p 334) 
Summary and conclusion
The ability of organisms (whether seagulls or scientists) to perceive and reason about the world means that we can and should allow for this possibility when thinking about how to design biologically-inspired robots. In particular, the abstraction of a virtual information-processing machine, itself understandable on various layers of abstraction, is one which seems to be required to explain many biological behaviours. Some biologically-inspired robots should include not just reactive but also deliberative and meta-management layers, not for the trivial reason that, e.g., mathematicians do these things and they are biological entities, but for the more substantial reason that merely reactive architectures do not even adequately characterise many vertebrates. Furthermore, we maintain that it is best to start now with a schema of possible architectures that encompasses all the forms that biological cognition might take, rather than limiting ourselves (either out of choice, or due to 'ontological blindness') to a design methodology which permits only low-level physical phenomena.
We shall try in later papers to show how the CogAff framework accommodates many architectures proposed so far, including subsumption, contention-scheduling (Cooper and Shallice, 2000) , Barkley's 'executive functions', and others. Even if it proves insufficiently general, there will still be a need for something like it as a unifying framework for AI.
